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1. Introduction  
The Central Eastern European (CEE)
1 countries are still in a transitional stage. EBRD (2005) 
emphasizes that improvements in governance, enterprise restructuring, and the financial sector 
have been the main features of the transition process in the past years. Kolodko (2000) and 
Wagner and Hlouskova (2005) argue that the CEE countries are going though a period of 
catching-up that might last for several decades. This view is typically based on the observation 
that per-capita GDP in the CEE countries is still below the level of the European Union member 
states, while the level of education in CEE countries is high, and institutional structures have 
been converging for some time, as Süppel (2003) highlights. Estimates of growth above the 
European average, and policies aimed at promoting innovative enterprises should lead to a 
strong demand for risk capital in the CEE countries and, hence, make them highly attractive to 
investors in Venture Capital and Private Equity (VC/PE) Limited Partnerships. 
However, the supply of risk capital is rather low compared to other European economies and 
relative to the expected opportunities for growth in the CEE countries, even if institutional 
investors are increasingly looking for new investment opportunities internationally. The first 
funds were raised shortly after the fall of communism. According to EVCA (2004, 2005, and 
2006), since then only slightly more than €9 billion has been raised by VC/PE funds dedicated 
to CEE countries. This raises questions as to what obstacles face institutional investors wanting 
to invest in the VC/PE asset class in that region. 
In this paper, we address these obstacles by means of a questionnaire sent out electronically to 
1,079 (potential) investors in VC/PE Limited Partnerships in CEE (the Limited Partners – LPs). 
We perform several tests and regression analyses and show that the protection of property 
rights is the most important issue when evaluating international allocation in VC/PE Limited 
Partnerships, followed by the need to find quality local fund management teams (the General 
Partners – GPs), as well as the need to be convinced about the quality and skills of the local 
                                              
1 We define CEE countries as those Central Eastern European countries that recently (i.e., in 2004 and 2007) gained 
accession to the European Union, namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and the Baltic States, which includes Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  
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entrepreneurial management teams. Furthermore, the expected deal flow plays an important 
role in the allocation process, given that the investors fear bribery and corruption. The results 
are strong, and do not differ meaningfully among the sub-groups of institutional investors, as, 
for example, Europeans and non-Europeans. We further find that institutional investors regard 
CEE as a very attractive region, on an equal ranking with India and a slightly higher one than 
China. Within CEE, LPs are most attracted by Poland, followed by the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. In CEE, the institutional investors regard economic activity and the entrepreneurial 
opportunities as favorable. There is, however, one very important finding, which is that they do 
not feel comfortable about their deepest wish, which is that of ensuring the protection of their 
claims. 
The paper is structured as follows. We briefly review related literature and then describe the 
questionnaire. Next, we provide the description of our sample, and then we comprehensively 
perform the analyses based on non-parametric tests and logit regressions. Each analysis is 
immediately followed by an interpretation of the findings.  Finally, we conclude. 
2. Literature Overview 
There exists a large body of papers regarding the evolution of foreign direct investments and 
the activity of (foreign and domestic) institutional investors in CEE and other emerging regions. 
Köke (1999) focuses on investment criteria of portfolio managers, Chan-Lau (2004) on the 
criteria of pension funds, Kaminsky et al. (2001) on the determinants of mutual funds, and 
Resmini (2000), Barrell and Holland (2000), Konings (2001), and Yudaeva et al. (2003) 
investigate determinants and consequences of foreign direct investments. Another large body of 
research explores the determinants of VC/PE activity in particular economies: Black and Gilson 
(1998), and Michelacci and Suarez (2004) focus on the role of the stock market for the VC/PE 
asset class. Gompers and Lerner (1998) examine the forces that affected independent VC/PE 
fundraising in the US. Lerner and Schoar (2004) analyze VC/PE transaction structures in 
developing countries. Jeng and Wells (2000) explore the determinants of VC/PE funding for 21 
countries, and expand on the work of Black and Gilson (1998). Desai et al. (2006) investigate 
the influence of institutional settings in 33 European countries, in particular the issues of 
fairness and the protection of property rights, on the entry of enterprises into the markets. 
Using a similar approach, Da Rin et al. (2005) argue that policymakers should consider a wide 
set of policies to improve emerging VC/PE markets, rather than simply channeling funds into 
the segment. 
Several papers focus on the evolvement of VC/PE in transition countries, and especially in CEE. 
Karsai et al. (1998) compare the operations of the Hungarian, Polish, and Slovakian markets 
with the UK VC/PE market, with respect to issues relating to screening and valuation. Similarly, 
Farag et al. (2004) focus on the VC/PE markets in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland and 
compare them with the German market. With a sample of 68 GPs in the transition countries, 
they find several factors that hinder the CEE markets in catching up and reaching the chosen 
benchmark. One clear, major obstacle is a lack of talented people to manage the VC/PE-backed 
enterprises, as the quality of management ranks highly as a reason for investment failure. This 
finding is also consistent with Bliss (1999), Karsai et al. (1998), and Chu and Hisrich (2001). 
Furthermore, debt financing remains limited, thus making it difficult to gain the desired returns 
by leveraging transactions. The authors suggest that legal and institutional improvements to 
protect lenders effectively can, therefore, lead to growth in the supply of risk capital. Johnson  
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et al. (1999) emphasize the importance of the protection of property rights in CEE, while they 
find access to banking finance does not present a problem. 
Klonowski (2005a) defines 26 decision criteria for individual transactions in CEE economies, 
and identifies the most important ones through a survey of 200 GPs in various CEE countries. 
Klonowski (2005b) describes the evolution of the Polish VC/PE market and thereby 
differentiates three different phases (development, expansion, and correction). He gives strength 
to the argument that Poland broadly followed a “normal Western Europe” VC/PE market cycle. 
Schöfer and Leitinger (2002) analyze the framework for VC/PE in various CEE countries. They 
conclude that the development of enterprises, and especially of technology start-ups, is 
restricted due to the lack in supply of risk capital. Therefore, they conclude, there is a strong 
demand for VC/PE in these countries. 
All the papers mentioned above focus on the settings of several VC/PE markets using secondary 
data or results from surveys among GPs. Our research approach differs: We directly assess the 
sources of VC/PE capital, the (potential) institutional investors, and collect, through a 
questionnaire, information about their perceptions of the CEE region, and the parameters they 
use when deciding about international capital allocation. For the determination of the 
parameters we refer to the findings so far discussed in the literature. Combining the findings of 
previous research and the unique primary data set we have gathered, we are able to derive 
strong conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of the CEE region in attracting 
international capital and on the asset allocation process of institutional investors. 
3. Design of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire is divided into two parts. The first part contains the descriptive section and 
determines the respondent’s institution in terms of type, size, and some allocation hurdle rates. 
It also includes some questions about knowledge of the CEE region and the respondent’s 
perception of it and other emerging regions. The second part comprehensively deals with the 
socio-economic criteria that the respondent considers when taking decisions about international 
asset allocation for VC/PE investments. 
Some of the questions raised provide metric responses. However, the majority of the responses 
are ordinal, made via entries on a seven-point Likert scale. Other responses are categorical. The 
ordinal responses on the Likert scales range from poor to excellent or from not at all attractive 
to very attractive. To ensure that no important determinant is missed in our questionnaire, in 
parallel we ask the respondents to determine their most important asset allocation criteria using 
keywords. The analyses of these keywords ensure that no major topic is left out in our 
questionnaire. 
4. Sample Size, Structure, and Descriptive Statistics 
The survey was addressed via email to 1,079 Limited Partners worldwide. The geographic 
distribution of the addressees is as follows: 77% USA and Canada, 17% Europe, 5% Asia, and 
1% others. The e-mail addresses of the Limited Partners are collected from three commercial 
databases. It is not known what the entire population of LPs is in terms of numbers and funds 
under management. Each of the three databases claims to cover the worldwide population of  
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LPs, however, in matching them, we increase the number of players. Furthermore, we check 
several references and actively search for important and well-known LPs manually. We 
deliberately attempt to cover as many LPs as possible, nevertheless, matching the databases and 
the cross-checks might not secure a valid collection of LPs that, at least, represents the entire 
population. Even though the USA, as an economic region and as the best developed financial 
market, probably embodies the largest, most sophisticated market with the largest number of 
LPs, other regions, notably Asia, seem to be under-represented. However, in terms of funds 
under management, our data collection reliably represents the population. In our depository, 
none of the larger LPs should be missing, be it in the USA, Europe or Asia. The size of the LPs 
is important for our study, because, as described by Chemla (2005), only the larger ones will be 
able and willing to diversify into the emerging CEE market, and probably only from them 
would we receive a response. Additionally, we expect the LPs from the USA to be the most 
experienced, while the European ones would be more interested in the CEE region (for reasons 
of proximity), and therefore, we believe that an over-representation of US LPs in our depository 
of addressees will not harm our conclusions. We do not expect to receive many responses from 
LPs outside Europe and the USA, due to the existence of other emerging regions that would 
attract them more for reasons of proximity. 
4.1. Sample Structure 
From the 1,079 Limited Partners addressed we received 75 valid and valuable responses. This is 
a response rate of 7% and quite satisfying, when compared to some other studies that collect 
primary data about investors’ behavior by means of a questionnaire. For instance, Lerner and 
Schoar (2005) collect data from 28 Private Equity funds, and Köke (1999) considers a sample of 
only 21 responses. 
The responding LPs are segmented into the following groups: corporate investors, government 
agencies, banks, pension funds, insurance companies, funds of funds, endowments, and others. 
A geographic distinction is made, according to the origin of the investor: USA and Canada, 
Western Europe, CEE, and rest of the world. The segments are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Segmented Respondents (Type and Origin of Investors) 
Type of Investor  Frequency  Origin of Investor  Frequency 
Corporate Investors  4  USA and Canada  34 
Government Agency  1  Western Europe  37 
Banks 3  CEE  1 
Pension Funds  8  Rest of the World  3 
Insurance Companies  1 
Funds of Funds  29 
Endowments 2 
Others 26 
Not Available  1 
 
 
Unfortunately, the response rate from LPs that qualify themselves as ‘others’ is relatively large, 
and therefore only the ‘funds of funds’ group can be distinguished as homogeneous. 
Furthermore, as expected, we received more answers from European LPs, with a response rate 
of 49.3%, as compared to their occurrence in our depository of 17%. This might bias the results 
of our study for a second time. However, we will address this issue by assessing separately the 
response behavior for Europeans and non-Europeans.  
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4.2. Funds under Management and VC/PE Commitments 
59 respondents provided information regarding the size of the managed funds and the 
corresponding currency, and from 68 we received their percentage allocation in the VC/PE asset 
class. Table 2 presents the distribution of the sample, segmented by size and by the worldwide 
percentage allocation in the VC/PE asset class. 
Table 2 
Segmented Respondents (Fund Size) and VC/PE Allocation 
Fund Size  Frequency  VC/PE Allocation  Frequency 
< €100mn   9  < 30%  29 
€100mn – 999mn  18  30% - 89%  8 
€1,000mn–9,999mn 23  90%  -  100%  31 
> €9,999mn 9     
 
The fund sizes are relatively heterogeneous, while the worldwide commitments to the VC/PE 
asset class are not. A large portion of the funds allocates 90% or more of their funds under 
management into the asset class. This is a rather surprising result, and leads us to investigate 
the relation between the size of the fund and the percentage of VC/PE allocation. We assume 
that the percentage of a fund’s allocation in the VC/PE capital market segment decreases with 
the size of the fund. The reason for this is that the smaller funds might be specialized VC/PE 
funds that receive their capital from already diversified investors, and do not need to diversify 
among different asset classes. Therefore, we perform a Kruskal-Wallis test with the hypotheses 
H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk to test whether the percentage allocation of the funds differs with 
fund size. The results are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Kruskal Wallis Test on the Commitment to the VC/PE Asset Class, Grouped by Size 
Funds under 
Management  N  Mean rank 
Mean % commitment 




< €100mn  9  24,06  41,844  Chi-Square  10,264 
€100mn - 999mn  18  34,00  67,183  df  3 
€1,000mn -9,999mn  22  33,64  61,273  Asymp. Sig.  ,016 
>€9,999mn  9  15,83  22,667     
Total  58     54,102     
 
We find a significant difference in the mean commitments of the funds grouped by fund size. 
Hence, H0 has to be rejected, but not in the expected way. The result is rather surprising and 
leads to the conclusion that the smallest and largest funds in our sample (with 41.8% 
respectively with 22.7% average VC/PE allocation in each group) have a smaller percentage 
allocation than the medium-sized funds (between €100 million and €10 billion, with average 
allocations of 67.2%, and 61.3% respectively). Obviously, the medium-sized funds are the 
entities that are more specialized in VC/PE. 
Regarding CEE exposure we received responses from 59 LPs, 25 of which have no exposure in 
CEE. 23 funds have some exposure, less than €50 million, 4 have exposure ranging from 
€50 million to €100 million, while the remaining have greater exposure. The minimum  
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commitment to a single fund, required to satisfy cost benefit ratios and internal hurdle rates of 
the LPs, is presented in Figure 1. This question is raised in a general context, without any 
geographical focus of the allocation. 
 
Figure 1 









The information is provided by 55 respondents, with a mean minimum exposure of 
€13.5  million, a median of €10 million and a standard deviation of €16.1 million. The 
particularly large minimal exposures are named by large funds of fund investors that probably 
strive for diversification on subsequent levels. More than two thirds of the respondents name 
the minimum exposure in a single fund as being less than €11 million. Those investors better 
qualified for limited VC/PE partnerships in the CEE region, which are, in respect to the size of 
the market and typical transactions, smaller than those in Western Europe or North America.  
55 LPs name their maximum commitment to a single fund in terms of the fund’s stake, leading 
to an average of 18.6 % and a median of 15 % with a standard deviation of 17.2 % points. 
Almost half of the respondents usually take minority stakes of the funds below 10 %, while the 
others are prepared to take leading positions above 10 %. Two of the respondents would even 
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Figure 2 











Regarding knowledge of the CEE region, the responses gave an expected picture of our 
questionnaire participants. On the seven-point Likert scale ranging from poor knowledge 1 to 
excellent knowledge 7, the one participant from within the CEE region estimates his/her own 
knowledge of CEE as 6. We received an average of 4.65 for the other European respondents, an 
average of 4.21 for the North Americans, and one of 3 for the rest of the world. In a subsequent 
question the participants are asked about the attractiveness of CEE for VC/PE allocations on the 
seven-point Likert scale. We find a significant (p = 0.006) Spearman’s correlation coefficient of 
0.33, signaling that well-informed investors regard the region as attractive. 
Summarizing the descriptive statistics, it can be reported that we received a diverse sample of 
(potential) investors in the VC/PE asset class in terms of size, type, relevant geographical 
origins, exposure in VC/PE, and VC/PE exposure in the CEE region. The data is 
comprehensively analyzed in the subsequent sections of this paper. 
5. Analysis 
5.1. Country Preferences 
CEE is in competition with other emerging regions for attracting funding from investors. Hence, 
we are interested in investor preferences concerning different regions of growth in the world, 
differentiating between Africa, CEE, China, CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States – the 
former Soviet Union), India, Latin America, and South East Asia. The respondents specify their 
perceptions on a range from not at all attractive 1 to very attractive 7, on the seven-point 
Likert scale. The mean nominations, the ± σ percentile, and the number of responses concerning 
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Figure 3 











To obtain a clearer picture about the ranking of the attractiveness of the emerging economies 
for institutional VC/PE investors, we perform pair-wise Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests. The H0 
hypothesis in each case is µi = µk, while the alternative H1 hypothesis is µi ≠ µk. The test results 
are presented in Appendix 1. Unfortunately, the results still fail to provide a final ranking of 
the individual regions on a 0.05 significance level. Some ranks are tied. Table 4 presents the 
ranking according to the tests. 
Table 4 
Ranks of Attractiveness of Different Emerging Regions 
 
Region Rank(s) 
India  1 / 2 
CEE  1 / 2 / 3 
China  2 / 3 / 4 
South East Asia  3 / 4 
CIS 5 
Latin America  6 
Africa 7 
 
According to Table 4 we can define three tier groups: The first tier group consists of India, the 
CEE countries, and China, while China might also belong to the second tier group, together with 
South East Asia. CIS, Latin America, and Africa belong to the third tier group in the mentioned 
order of attractiveness. Similarly, we question the attractiveness of the individual CEE countries 
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Figure 4 












Again, a clear ranking is not possible on the basis of the mean scores, and we perform pair-
wise Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests to test in each case if H0: µi = µk, else H1: µi ≠ µk. The test 
results are presented in Appendix 2. Unfortunately, as before, the tests do not reveal a final 
ranking of all the CEE countries’ attractiveness for VC/PE investors on a 0.05 significance level. 
However, Poland ranks clearly before all the other CEE states. Subsequent ranks are tied. 
Performing one-tailed tests with the hypotheses H0: µi = µk, else H1: µi ≤ µk allows the 
definition of four tier groups: The top tier is Poland, while the Czech Republic and Hungary 
belong to the second tier group. The third tier group includes Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 




Ranks of Attractiveness for Institutional Investors of Different CEE Countries 
 
Country  Rank(s) based on two-
tailed tests 
Rank(s) based on one-
tailed tests 
Poland 1  1 
Czech Republic  2 / 3  2 / 3 
Hungary  2 / 3 / 4 / 5  2 / 3 / 4 
Baltic States  3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7  3 / 4 / 5 / 6 /7 
Romania  3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7  4 / 5 / 6 / 7 
Slovakia  4 / 5 / 6 / 7  4 / 5 / 6 / 7 
Slovenia  4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8  4 / 5 / 6 / 7 
































Countries and Number of Responses 
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5.2. Country Allocation Criteria 
We refer to the findings of various research papers that deal with asset allocation processes of 
institutional investors, or investigate the necessary requirements for a vibrant local VC/PE 
market and culture, with the aim of determining the most important criteria for the country 
allocation process of institutional investors. 
For instance, Gompers and Lerner (1998) point out that there are more attractive opportunities 
for entrepreneurs if the economy is large, and growing. Wilken (1979) argues that economic 
development facilitates entrepreneurship, as it provides a greater accumulation of capital for 
investments. Romain and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004) find that VC/PE activity is 
related to GDP growth.  
Jeng and Wells (2000) stress that a main driving factor for a VC/PE market is the IPO activity, 
because it reflects the potential return for the VC/PE funds. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) confirm 
this finding. Black and Gilson (1998), and Gompers and Lerner (2000) emphasize that risk 
capital flourishes in countries with deep and liquid stock markets. The availability of debt 
financing is another key factor for start-ups entering the market, as emphasized by Greene 
(1998), and hence a determinant for a VC/PE market. Additionally, the maturity of the VC/PE 
market itself might attract investors. The maturity of a local VC/PE market is also reflected in 
the number of players and supporting institutions, such as law firms, investment banks, M&A 
boutiques, auditors and consultants. Sapienza et al. (1996) claim that whether or not the VC/PE 
market is accepted within a society, and the historical development of that market, determine 
investor confidence. Balboa and Martí (2003) find that annual fundraising volume is dependent 
on the previous year’s market liquidity. Chemla (2005) argues that the management of VC/PE 
funds is costly. Particular regions become attractive to investors only if the deal flow is large 
enough, and if transaction volumes and expected payoffs exceed a certain amount that allows 
the management fees to be covered.  
Issues related to the protection of property rights might also be major obstacles for the 
development of a VC/PE market. La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) confirm that the legal 
environment greatly determines the size and extent of a country’s capital market and local 
firms’ ability to receive outside financing. They emphasize the difference between law on paper 
and the actual quality of law enforcement in some countries. Desai et al. (2006) discuss that 
fairness and the protection of property rights significantly influence the growth and emergence 
of new enterprises. La Porta et al. (2002) find a lower cost of capital for companies in countries 
with better investor protection. Lerner and Schoar (2005) confirm these findings. Johnson et al. 
(1999) show that weak property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in start-up firms. Even 
so, Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), and Svensson (1998) demonstrate that property 
rights significantly affect investments and economic growth. 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) stress that the capital gains tax rate influences VC/PE activity. 
Bruce (2000 and 2002), and Cullen and Gordon (2002) show that taxes affect the entry and exit 
of businesses. It can be concluded that this should be mirrored in VC/PE activity. 
Rigid labor market policies might negatively affect the attractiveness of a VC/PE market. 
Institutional investors could hesitate to invest in countries with exaggerated labor market 
protection and immobility. Lazear (1990) and Blanchard (1997) discuss how protection of 
workers can reduce employment and growth. Black and Gilson (1998) show that variations in 
labor market restrictions correlate with VC/PE activity.  
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Access to viable investments is probably the most important factor for the attractiveness of a 
regional VC/PE market. In order to foster a growing risk capital industry, Megginson (2004) 
argues that the R&D culture, especially in universities or national laboratories, plays an 
important role. Gompers and Lerner (1998) show that both industrial and academic R&D 
expenditure is significantly correlated with VC/PE activity. Schertler (2003) emphasizes that the 
number of employees in the R&D field and the number of patents, as an approximation of the 
human capital endowment, have a positive and highly significant influence on VC/PE activity. 
Furthermore, Romain and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004) find that the level of 
entrepreneurship interacts with the R&D capital stock, technological opportunities, and the 
number of patents. Lee and Peterson (2000), and Baughn and Neupert (2003) argue that 
national cultures shape both individual orientation and environmental conditions, which lead 
to different levels of entrepreneurial activity in particular countries, and which should affect the 
level of acceptance of a risk capital culture. The acceptance of a risk capital culture in a society 
should also influence the funding activities of institutional investors. 
The questionnaire considers all these different issues, and groups them into six major 
categories: economic activity, capital market, taxation, investor protection, social environment, 
and entrepreneurial opportunities. The respondents are asked to evaluate the importance of the 
individual criteria for their decisions about international asset allocation on a seven-point 
Likert scale, ranging from not at all important 1 to very important 7. First, we perform analyses 
of the importance of the criteria within each category, and finally of all individual criteria to 
identify the most important for the institutional investors when deciding on international 
capital allocation. They results are described in the following sections. 
5.2.1. The Importance of Economic Activity 
Referring to the cited literature, we distinguish the parameters “economic growth” and 
“economic size” in our questionnaire to reveal the importance of the economic activity in a 
particular country for institutional investors’ allocation decisions. Figure 5 presents the 
assessments of both criteria measured by the means and by the ± σ-percentiles of the 
respondents’ evaluations. 
Figure 5 

















Economic Size [70] Economic Growth [58]
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The graph reveals that economic growth is more important than size and the dispersion of the 
evaluation of growth is less than that of size. The result is confirmed by a Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test with the hypothesis H0: µ1 = µ2, and H1: µ1 ≠ µ2. The test statistic is presented in 
Appendix 3 and strongly rejects H0. Hence, when they evaluate economic conditions as part of 
their process of international asset allocation, institutional investors regard growth as the most 
important parameter. 
5.2.2. The Importance of the Capital Market 
Again referring to the cited literature, we distinguish the following parameters to investigate 
the importance of a local capital market for the allocation process: availability of debt 
financing, interest rates, capital market and M&A market activity, IPO activity, expected deal 
flow, presence of professional institutions and supporters (law firms, investment banks, 
auditors, and consultants), presence of qualified GPs, availability of public funding and 
subsidies, and the expected diversification effected by committing capital to that local market. 
Figure 6 presents the means of the responses and the ± σ-percentiles for each criterion. 
Figure 6 
Importance of Capital Market Criteria (Fluctuating Numbers of Responses). 












The presence of qualified GPs and the expected deal flow are the most important selection 
criteria, with average nominations of 6.35 and 6.17 on the Likert scale. However, deal flow has 
the lowest dispersion of responses, i.e., LPs strongly agree on the importance of that criterion. 
As discussed above, we perform pair-wise Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests with the hypothesis 
H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk to determine a ranking of the criteria. The test statistics are 
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Table 6 
Ranks of Importance of Criteria Regarding the Capital Market 
Criteria Rank(s) 
Presence of qualified GPs  1 / 2 
Expected deal flow  1 / 2 
General capital and M&A market activity  3 
Presence of professional institutions to support  4 
Availability of debt finance in the target country  5 / 6 
IPO market activity  5 / 6 
Interest rates in the target country  7 / 8 
Diversification effect  7 / 8 
Availability of public funding and subsidies  9 
 
The tests reveal that the quality of GPs and the deal flow expectations dominate over all other 
criteria. The capital market segment quoted, the M&A market, and IPO activity are nevertheless 
important allocation criteria for LPs, but not as dominant as expected. This in some ways 
contradicts existing literature that emphasizes the importance of the exit conditions for 
transactions by IPOs, as, for example, in Jeng and Wells (2000) and Kaplan and Schoar (2005). 
Interestingly, the debt market and the price of debt are not as meaningful as anticipated. One 
could argue that the price of (default-free) debt sets the minimum return requirements in a 
particular country, and hence plays a role in the allocation process. However, LPs obviously do 
not consider this criterion important in general. Later in this paper we will address this issue 
when we analyze the data by grouping investors into distinctive sub-segments. Furthermore, 
diversification does not play an important role for investors in the VC/PE market segment. LPs 
seem to be well diversified already, or aware that they manage money that is already well 
diversified. 
A clear finding, and one that might be unpleasant for policymakers, is that the availability of 
public funding and subsidies is not an important issue for the majority of the institutional 
investors when deciding on their VC/PE allocations. The (potential) investors regard this as the 
least important (mean = 3.23) of all the criteria we consider in the questionnaire. However, 
the criterion also has a large dispersion (standard deviation = 1.42), signaling that some of the 
investors obviously follow public activities. Summarizing this issue, and referring to Da Rin et 
al. (2005), it can be argued that private money does not, in the end, follow public money in the 
VC/PE market segment. 
5.2.3. The Importance of Taxes 
We focus on the corporate tax rate and dividend and capital gains taxes, only in determining 
the importance of taxes in respect to the international allocation decisions of institutional 
investors. Despite many other taxes and tax policies that potentially influence the activities of 
LPs in individual countries, the ones mentioned are those that have the greatest impact on 
business, and those that are somewhat comparable across countries with different tax regimes. 
Corporate taxes are relevant on the transaction level, and dividend and capital gains taxes on 
the investor level. Figure 7 presents the means of the responses concerning their importance, 
and the ± σ-percentiles for both taxes. 
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Figure 7 










We propose the hypothesis that both taxes are equally important, H0: µ1 = µ2, while the 
alternative is that the importance differs, H1: µ1 ≠ µ2. The Wilkoxon Signed Rank test proves 
dominance of dividend and capital gains taxes. The test result is presented in Appendix 5. 
Investors are obviously more concerned about the taxes that affect them directly. 
5.2.4. The Importance of the Protection of Property Rights  
As property rights and protection for investors play such a dominant role in literature on 
investment determinants and practice, we directly raise the question about their importance in 
the international asset allocation process. The overwhelming result is a mean importance of 
6.55. The answers range from 4 to 7 points only and, therefore, have the lowest dispersion of all 
the responses, with a standard deviation of 0.63. This reveals that LPs very much agree that 
their protection is the most important issue among all the selection criteria we consider in the 
questionnaire. We will describe the tests for the overall importance of particular criteria at a 
later stage in this paper. 
5.2.5. The Importance of the Social Environment 
We distinguish the following criteria as determinants that might influence the allocation 
decisions of institutional investors when considering the social environment of their VC/PE 
target countries: bribery and corruption, the crime rate, expected entrepreneurial management 
quality and skills, language and cultural differences, labor market rigidities, and acceptance of 
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Figure 8 











Again, Wilkoxon Signed Rank tests with the hypotheses H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk result in the 
ranking in Table 7. The test statistics are presented in Appendix 6. 
Table 7 
Ranks of Importance of Criteria Regarding the Social Environment 
Criteria Rank(s) 
Expected entrepreneurial management quality and skills  1 
Bribery and corruption  2 
Acceptance of VC/PE  3 
Crime rate  4 / 5 
Labor market rigidities  4 / 5 
Language and cultural differences  6 
 
The tests reveal that the expected quality of management is the most important criteria when 
evaluating the social environment of a country for VC/PE allocations, followed by the issues of 
bribery and corruption, and the acceptance of the asset class in the country. The finding 
underpins the common sense approach found in VC/PE practice when referring to the character 
of the asset class as “people’s business”. Institutional investors allocate funds to particular 
countries if they are convinced about the quality and the skills of local management teams. 
This finding is also consistent with Farag et al. (2004), Bliss (1999), Karsai et al. (1998), and Chu 
and Hisrich (2001). 
The crime rate, labor market rigidities and language and cultural differences clearly do not play 
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5.2.6. The Importance of the Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
For the discussion of the importance of entrepreneurial opportunities that might influence the 
decisions taken by institutional investors concerning international allocations, we identify 
the parameters: already proven success strategies, general entrepreneurial activity, and 
technological innovations and patents. Figure 9 presents the mean nominations and the ± σ-
percentiles of the investors’ answers regarding these determinants. 
Figure 9 










The Wilkoxon Signed Rank tests, presented in Appendix 7, with the hypotheses H0: µi = µk, and 
H1: µi ≠ µk lead to a clear ranking, headed by the entrepreneurial activities, followed by already 
proven success and the criterion innovations and patents. LPs are obviously future-oriented 
investors that prefer to draw conclusions about future options from the current entrepreneurial 
spirit rather than from historic success, or just from the number of patents. Again, this 
highlights the focus of institutional investors on people and future potential, rather than on 
institutions and historic experience. 
5.3. The Most Important Criteria 
So far, we have investigated the importance of several criteria grouped into six categories. Now, 
we will address the five most important criteria of them all. The criteria with the highest 
average important scores are: protection of property and investor’s rights (6.55), presence of 
qualified GPs (6.35), expected entrepreneurial management quality and skills (6.35), expected 
deal flow (6.17), and bribery and corruption (5.91). The Wilkoxon Signed Rank tests with the 
hypotheses H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk are described in Appendix 8 and lead to the results 
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Table 8 
The Five Most Important Criteria for LPs’ International VC/PE Allocation Decisions 
 
Criteria Rank(s) 
Protection of property and investor’s rights  1 / 2 
Presence of qualified GPs  1 / 2 / 3 / 4 
Expected entrepreneurial management quality and skills  2 / 3 / 4 
Expected deal flow  2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
Bribery and corruption  4 / 5 
 
 
Table 8 reveals that the definition of particular ranks is impossible on a 0.05 significance level 
(the results do not change meaningfully by performing one-tailed tests). However, the 
protection of investors is clearly a dominant criterion. The investors’ claims in the funds and, 
additionally, the claims of the funds in the target companies have to be secured. If institutional 
investors are not confident about that issue, they are reluctant to invest. Hence, issues relating 
to investor protection are the major obstacles for the development of a local VC/PE market. 
Nevertheless, the presence of qualified GPs and the expected entrepreneurial management 
quality and skills follow closely, and emphasize once again the role of talented people for the 
asset class. If investors do not feel they can rely on people as the driving forces of the VC/PE 
business and of the target companies, they will not commit any capital. Following on from the 
role of people, the capital market conditions, expressed by the expected deal flow, materialize. 
It has to be emphasized here that the potential deal flow also depends on several other socio-
economic and market factors, and it is difficult to regard it as a particular determinant. The deal 
flow, for instance, is certainly influenced by economic growth and size and by the presence of 
supporting institutions, such as investment banks, and M&A boutiques, among others. 
Finally, and coinciding with their desire for protection, investors fear bribery and corruption as 
these interfere with the enforcement of their claims. 
5.4. Applying These Criteria to CEE 
To investigate investors’ concerns about the CEE region we determine their ratings of the 
various proposed criteria. To do this, we ask them to evaluate the region according to 
the grouped criteria, namely the capital market, the social environment, investor protection, 
taxation, economic, and entrepreneurial conditions, on the seven-point Likert scale from not at 
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Figure 10 











Figure 10 shows the means of the nominations and the ± σ-percentiles regarding investors’ 
satisfaction with the six key driving factors. Again, as no clear ranking across the key driving 
factors is possible, we perform the Wilkoxon Signed Rank tests with the hypotheses H0: µi = µk, 
and H1: µi ≠ µk. The tests are documented in Appendix 9 and the results are presented 
in Table 9. 
Table 9 
The Attractiveness of CEE Countries with Respect to Six Country Allocation Key Driving Factors 
 
Criteria Rank(s) 
Economic activity  1 
Entrepreneurial opportunities  2 
Taxation  3 / 4 / 5 
Capital market  3 / 4 / 5 /6 
Social environment  4 / 5 / 6 
Investor protection  4 / 5 / 6 
 
It becomes clear that while economic and entrepreneurial conditions are regarded as quite 
attractive, the most important investment obstacle, namely, the protection of property rights, is 
ranked poorly. The second and third most important criteria: the presence of qualified GPs and 
expected entrepreneurial management quality and skills, are largely determined by the social 
and capital market environment in these countries, and also receive the lowest rankings. 
Institutional investors clearly miss a satisfying level of investor protection, entrepreneurial 
management skills, and capital market activity. Thereby, it is not relevant whether these 
perceptions are based on correct specifications of the proposed key driving factors or on 
insufficient knowledge of a reality that could in fact be more favorable. In either case, 
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5.5. Grouping Investors 
Our heterogeneous sample of 75 LPs can be partitioned into several homogeneous sub-samples. 
The following categories can be assigned to the respondents: They either are or are not 
European, they either are or are not funds of funds, or they either can or cannot be grouped 
into entities that are focused on VC/PE investments, and hence specialized (with a high 
percentage of VC/PE exposure). All the criteria split the sample roughly fifty-fifty. The research 
question for the sub-samples is always as to whether there are any differences in their 
responses regarding the findings so far. We obtain the required results by running Mann 
Whitney U tests. First, we distinguish European and non-European LPs. 
It could be argued that European investors would have a better knowledge of CEE than non-
Europeans due to the geographic proximity. Additionally, Europeans could follow other criteria 
in their international asset allocation process. To test this hypothesis and similar ones we 
perform Mann Whitney U tests, using H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk. The descriptive statistics of 
the analyses with significant results and the corresponding tests are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10 
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0  N  30  31  33  33  29  33  32 
  Mean  22,733  4,19  4,12  4,67  5,45  4,88  4,72 
  Std. deviation  17,7840  1,327  1,576  1,190  ,827  1,139  1,397 
1  N  33  37  37  37  28  35  35 
  Mean  14,364  4,84  3,27  5,30  5,96  4,17  3,91 
   Std. deviation  15,9390  1,385  1,146  1,175  ,962  1,043  1,422 
  Mann-Whitney U  296,500  421,500  421,500  444,000  258,500  368,500  388,000 
  Z  -2,770  -1,920  -2,274  -2,019  -2,494  -2,679  -2,203 
   Asymp. sig. (2-
tailed)  ,006  ,055  ,023  ,043  ,013  ,007  ,028 
 
Table 10 presents the descriptive statistics for the analyses, where partitioning the sample into 
European (= 1) and non-European (= 0) LPs gives significant results, and the corresponding 
tests. The results reveal that non-European investors are prepared to maintain a higher 
maximum exposure in a fund. They regard the CIS region as more attractive than the 
Europeans, and India as less attractive. They also regard China as less attractive (based on a 
one-tailed test, H0: µ1 = µ2, and H1: µ1 ≤ µ2). There seems to be some kind of “inverse 
relationship” between the proximity of a region and perceptions about it. The European and 
non-European investors likewise regard further away regions as more attractive. European 
investors focus more on expectations of growth in their international allocation process. In 
regard to the CEE, they evaluate taxation as worse than the non-Europeans. This could be due 
to a better understanding of the CEE tax regimes. Furthermore, within CEE, the Baltic States are 
regarded as less attractive than they are among non-Europeans. We do not find significant 
differences between European and non-European LPs regarding their estimated knowledge of 
CEE, or any other determinant than those mentioned. This allows us to conclude that  
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institutional investors operating on an international level do not differ greatly across different 
regions of origin in their approaches to international capital allocation. 
The following analyses deal with differences between the funds dedicated to VC/PE only, and 
other ones. We distinguish the funds dedicated to the VC/PE asset class from other ones on the 
basis of the percentage of fund allocation to VC/PE being higher than 90%. It could be argued 
that the focused funds are more experienced and more professional in their due diligence and 
allocation processes. Additionally, they might have better knowledge of the VC/PE markets and 
local conditions in different regions of the world. To test these and other hypotheses we 
perform Mann Whitney U tests again, using H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk. Table 11 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the analyses with significant results and the corresponding tests. 
Table 11 

















































0  N  36  36  35  31  37  37  37  37  35 
  Mean  ,42  16,556  3,60  5,90  4,59  6,19  5,14  4,70  4,83 
  Std. deviation  ,500  17,3575  1,063  ,831  1,343  ,701  1,456  1,244  1,071 
1  N  29  23  28  22  29  29  28  29  29 
  Mean  ,66  21,565  2,82  5,41  5,38  6,52  5,86  4,07  4,17 
  Std. deviation  ,484  17,7478  1,020  1,008  ,979  ,688  ,891  ,998  1,167 
  Mann-Whitney U  397,500  303,500  300,000  241,500  346,000  395,000  375,000  387,500  376,500 




,058  ,081  ,006  ,057  ,011  ,045  ,051  ,046  ,065 
 
Table 11 presents the descriptive statistics for the analyses, where splitting the sample into 
VC/PE specialized (= 1) and non-specialized (= 0) LPs produces significant results, and the 
corresponding tests. The analyses reveal that funds dedicated to the VC/PE asset class more 
often have a commitment in the CEE region than other funds (this and some other results 
further discussed below, are based on one-tailed tests with H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≤ µk). The 
finding can be interpreted twofold: On the one hand, specialized VC/PE investors might more 
comprehensively perform regional due diligence, and hence might be aware of several favorable 
conditions in CEE. However, on the other hand, the greater commitment in the CEE could also 
be due to geographic diversification requirements for the specialized VC/PE funds. Both 
arguments seem plausible, but because the focused funds do not evaluate CEE (statistically 
significant) as more attractive than their non-focused peers, the latter argument seems to be the 
more likely. 
However, the specialized funds are willing to subscribe larger maximum stakes in single funds, 
and they regard Latin America as less attractive than the general funds do. In their regional due 
diligence process they do not consider growth opportunities as important, and therefore focus 
on the availability of debt finance, the expected entrepreneurial management quality and skills 
of people, and on the acceptance of the asset class in the target region. The greater importance 
given to debt might result from a larger exposure of these funds in later stage investments 
(such as buyouts and turnaround financing) where debt financing plays a larger role. This could  
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similarly be the case for societal acceptance, because later stage transactions are more often 
publicly debated, typically due to their size and the consequences of restructuring. 
The increased attention granted to managerial potential might result from greater experience on 
the level of individual transactions, where the requirement for excellent management teams 
often becomes obvious. Furthermore, the focused investors regard the capital market and the 
tax regime in CEE as less attractive than do the non-specialized investors. A possible 
explanation for this finding again lies in a deeper regional due diligence, especially in the tax 
regimes, that might not be very attractive in all facets. In summary, it can be argued that 
investors closer to the individual target investments have slightly different opinions in regard 
to several allocation criteria and country perceptions. 
The final distinction is made by separating funds of funds from other categories of investors. 
Funds of funds will, as indicated by the name, diversify among different funds. They delegate 
the management activities to lower levels and, therefore, have to rely more on the subsequent 
chain of agents, than other investors who can allocate their capital more directly. As a result, 
they should differ in respect to their allocation profiles, and they might have different asset 
allocation criteria and perceptions of the region. To test these hypotheses we perform the Mann 
Whitney U tests once again, using H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk. The descriptive statistics of the 
significant results and the corresponding tests are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 
Descriptive Statistics of the Analyses with Significant Results 
Fund 
of 




to single fund 
Risk/return 





0  N  40  34  31  43  43 
  Mean  34,573  10,559  4,90  6,07  5,21 
  Std. deviation  39,6687  18,1412  1,399  1,316  1,337 
1  N  27  26  20  25  27 
   Mean  87,185  14,692  4,20  6,84  5,93 
   Std. deviation  26,5751  12,1845  1,105  ,374  1,035 
  Mann-Whitney U  178,000  261,000  214,000  364,000  398,000 
  Z  -4,854  -2,743  -1,901  -2,630  -2,274 
   Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,006  ,057  ,009  ,023 
 
The proposed differences are supported by the data. Firstly, the funds of funds do not greatly 
differ from the specialized funds we considered previously in the sample partition tests. They 
are characterized by a significant average commitment to the VC/PE asset class of 87.2% and a 
median of even 100%. This signals that the majority of the funds of funds are, at the same time, 
focused on VC/PE and hence, they are so-called VC/PE Funds of Funds. However, analyzing the 
data more closely reveals that 9 funds with 100% VC/PE exposure do not qualify themselves as 
funds of funds, and inversely, 5 funds identify themselves as funds of funds but each have a 
very low VC/PE exposure. Whatever the case may be, it can be argued that, once again, we 
identify a more specialized type of investor, and find that while their funds under management 
are not significantly larger than those of their peers, they are looking for a higher level of 
commitment in general and, hence, raise the minimum commitment level. Furthermore, the 
funds of funds demand more of their investees because they are less satisfied with the CEE  
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risk/return ratio (this result is based on a one-tailed test, H0: µ1 = µ2, and H1: µ1 ≤ µ2). Also, 
they have an even greater focus on people, because they regard the presence of qualified GPs as 
well as societal acceptance of the asset class as more important than other investors. This is 
probably due to the fact that, as mentioned before, funds of funds have to rely heavily on the 
agents in the subsequent chain of diversification. 
5.6. Investment Decision Determinants 
One major distinction within our analyses is the actual decision to invest in CEE. Regardless of 
the size of the fund, its origins, its internal hurdle rates in respect to international allocation, 
and its minimum and maximum exposures, it is important to distinguish between the funds 
that have commitments in CEE and those that do not. The question of what determines the 
decision to allocate funds to CEE countries can be best addressed through logit regression, 
because this directly relates the binary dependent variable of the investment decision to several 
decision parameters. We assume that an investor’s final decision to allocate funds for VC/PE 
investments in the CEE region is dependent on certain characteristics, as discussed in the 
previous part of the paper. 
For a binary (0 – 1) variable Y and a vector of p explanatory variables x at values X = (x1,…,xp), 
let 
() () () x X x X x = = − = = = = 0 1 1 Y P Y P π , 
where P(…) measures the probability of an event. The logit regression model is then: 
logit         = log  p p o x x x β β β β
π
π





2 2 1 1 x
x
        ( 1 )
 
The intercept parameter β0 is usually not of particular interest, but can be interpreted as log 
odds if the explanatory variables are null. The parameter βi refers to the effect of xi on the 
log odds of Y = 1, controlling for the other xj. Exponentiating (1) shows that exp(βi) is 
the multiplicative effect on the odds of a 1-unit increase in xi, at fixed levels of the other xj. 
Using logit regressions we comprehensively test several hypotheses, and below we focus on 
those with significant results only. The dependent variable in all of the following cases is the 
issue of whether or not a LP has exposure in the region. We define the hypotheses, present the 
statistical tests of the model, and conclude the findings: 
Hypotheses No.1: 
H0: LPs invest in CEE countries irrespective of their level of satisfaction about the historical 
performance in that region. 
H1: LPs invest in CEE countries because they are satisfied with the historical performance, and 
expect extrapolation. 
The analysis is based on 47 observations, of which 33 LPs have exposure in CEE. It results in a 
significant parameter of investor satisfaction with historical risk and return ratios, and the H0 
hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 
[] ) (x π 
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Table 13 
Logit Regression Results (R-rjudge, Independent Variable is the Evaluation of the Historical 
Risk/Return Ratio in CEE) 
  B  S.E.  Wald  Sig.  Exp(B)  Chi-square  Model-Sig. 
R-rjudge     ,539    ,256  4,450  ,035  1,715 
Constant  -1,529  1,140  1,800  ,180    ,217 
5,009  ,025 
 
The exponential of the parameter β1, exp(β1), is the odds ratio of maintaining exposure in the 
CEE region. On the basis of these findings, it can be argued that an increase of one point in our 
Likert scale in the question about investor’s satisfaction with the historical performance in CEE 
countries, increases the odds to invest in the region. For an investor who is indifferent as to 
whether or not to invest, i.e., with a probability of 50% or an odds of 1, all else being equal an 
increase of one point in the level of satisfaction with the historical performance, leads to a new 
odds ratio of 1.715 and, hence, to a investment probability rate of 1.715/(1+1.715) = 63.2%. 
Obviously, the historic performance greatly influences decisions about future allocations. This 
supports the findings in literature on the tendency of extrapolation of performance results, e.g., 
in Friend and Vickers (1965), or Lakonishok et al. (1994). However, this is a rational approach 
considering the findings on performance persistence in Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Elton et al. 
(1996), and especially those concerning the private equity capital market segment in Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005). 
Hypotheses No. 2: 
H0: LPs invest in the CEE region irrespective of their level of knowledge about the countries. 
H1: Only LPs with adequate knowledge invest in the CEE region. 
The analysis is based on 65 observations, of which 32 LPs have exposure in CEE, and the 
results show that a significant parameter of regional knowledge determines the investment 
decision. Hence, the H0 hypothesis is rejected. 
Table 14 
Logit Regression Results (Knowl, Independent Variable Is the Knowledge About the CEE Region) 
  B  S.E.  Wald  Sig.  Exp(B)  Chi-square  Model-Sig. 
Knowl.      ,787  ,225  12,292  ,000  2,198 
Constant  -3,468  1,031  11,311  ,001     ,031 
17,184  ,000 
 
The result proves a very strong correlation between informed investors and the decision to 
allocate, with an odds ratio of 2.198 per point on our Likert scale. This strong result highlights 
the importance of efforts to be informed. The likelihood of investing in the region becomes, all 
else being equal, 2.198/(1+2.198) = 68.7% for an otherwise indifferent investor who increases 
his knowledge about the region by one point on our Likert scale. Limited Partners obviously do 
not naively diversify, but make decisions about allocations based on regional knowledge. They 
do not follow a 1/n heuristic, as discussed in Benartzi and Thaler (2001), and only invest if they 
have sufficient regional expertise. This result is also confirmed by Fernandes (2004) who  
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emphasizes the need for elaborate country selection strategies in order to outperform 
benchmarks. 
Hypotheses No. 3: 
H0: Institutional investors invest in the CEE region irrespective of their perceptions of (other) 
emerging markets. 
H1: Investors with exposure in CEE are also attracted by other emerging regions. There is a 
tendency for “emerging market investors”. 
The analysis is performed separately for the different emerging regions Africa, CEE, China, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS - the former Soviet Union), India, Latin America, 
and South East Asia to omit the problem of a reduced sample caused by the lack of responses 
from individual participants for all the regions. The H0 hypothesis has to be accepted for China, 
India, Latin America, and South East Asia, and has to be rejected for Africa, CEE, and CIS. 
In the case of Africa, we observe 64 responses, of which 33 investors have exposure in CEE. The 
analysis reveals that the perception of Africa has a significant influence on the decision about 
allocations to CEE. 
Table 15 
Logit Regression Results (AttrAfr, Independent Variable Is the Evaluation of Africa’s Attractiveness) 
  B  S.E.  Wald  Sig.  Exp(B)  Chi-square  Model-Sig. 
AttrAfr    ,451  ,227  3,965  ,046  1,571 
Constant  -,888  ,529  2,822  ,093    ,411 
4,619  ,032 
 
In the case of CEE itself, we observe 68 responses, of which 35 investors have exposure in CEE. 
The analysis reveals that perceptions about the attractiveness of the CEE region have a 
significant influence on the decision about allocations to the CEE. 
Table 16 
Logit Regression Results (AttrCEE, Independent Variable Is the Judgment of CEE’s Attractiveness) 
  B  S.E.  Wald  Sig.  Exp(B)  Chi-square  Sig. 
AttrCEE     ,610  ,251  5,914  ,015  1,841 
Constant  -2,976  1,276  5,434  ,020    ,051 
6,942  ,008 
 
For the CIS region, we observe 66 responses, of which 35 investors have exposure in CEE. The 
analysis reveals that the perception of the attractiveness of the CIS region has a significant 
influence on the decision about allocations to the CEE. 
Table 17 
Logit Regression Results (AttrCIS, Independent Variable Is the Judgment of CIS’ Attractiveness) 
  B  S.E.  Wald  Sig.  Exp(B)  Chi-square  Model-Sig. 
AttrCIS  ,561  ,209  7,181  ,007  1,753 
Constant  -1,920  ,796  5,810  ,016  ,147 
8,519  ,004  
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The decision to allocate funds to the CEE region is determined primarily by the evaluation of 
the attractiveness of the CEE region itself (odds ratio of 1.841), however, it is determined also 
by perceptions of Africa (odds ratio of 1.571) and the CIS region (odds ratio of 1.753). The 
decision about maintaining exposure in CEE is independent of perceptions of the other 
emerging regions, namely, China, India, Latin America, and South East Asia. While the 
correlation with perceptions of Africa is difficult to explain, the similarities between the CEE 
and the CIS regions are clear. These two markets, geographically close, are considered to be 
similar in terms of being former communist countries that have evolved to open market 
economies with or without accession to the European Union. Probably, investors in CEE also 
maintain exposure in CIS. However, this issue is not considered in our survey questions. 
Hypotheses No. 4: 
H0: Investors invest in the CEE region irrespective of their assessment of key socio-economic 
conditions in the region, such as economic activity, local capital markets, taxation, investor 
protection, the social environment, and entrepreneurial activities. 
H1: Investors closely link their decision to invest in CEE to the selection criteria mentioned in 
H0. 
The logit regression on the above-mentioned six parameters is based on 60 observations, of 
which 30 LPs have exposure in CEE. The results show a significant parameter for 
entrepreneurial opportunities only. Hence, the H0 hypothesis is rejected for entrepreneurial 
opportunities, but it is accepted for all the other key driving factors. 
Table 18 
Logit Regression Results (The Independent Variables Are Evaluations of the: EcoAct – Economic 
Activity, CapMark – Capital Market, Taxation – Taxation, InvProt – Investor Protection, SocEnv – 
Social Environment, and EntrOpp – Entrepreneurial Opportunities) 
  B  S.E.  Wald    Sig.  Exp(B)  Chi-square  Model-Sig. 
EcoAct  -,036  ,442  ,007  ,934  ,964 
CapMark  -,651  ,453  2,064  ,151  ,522 
Taxation  -,137  ,376  ,132  ,716  ,872 
InvProt  ,438  ,387  1,275  ,259  1,549 
SocEnv  -,348  ,453  ,592  ,442  ,706 
EntrOpp  1,331  ,411  10,473  ,001  3,787 
Constant  -3,466  1,918  3,265  ,071  ,031 
18,528  ,005 
 
 
The evaluation of the entrepreneurial opportunities very strongly determines the decision to 
allocate funds in the CEE region. All else being equal, an increase of 1 point on the Likert scale 
raises the probability of investing for an otherwise indifferent investor to 79.1%. LPs obviously 
decide to invest in CEE because of expected entrepreneurial opportunities. Investors in CEE are 
satisfied with entrepreneurial opportunities, but they are not sufficiently satisfied with the other 
key driving factors used in the model. This finding reveals the criteria for necessary 
improvements of the other driving factors to better attract international institutional capital for 
VC/PE funds. 
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Hypotheses No. 5: 
H0: LPs invest in the region irrespective of perceptions they could have about the quality of 
local fund management teams. 
H1: LPs invest only if they are confident about the quality of the local teams. 
The logit regression is based on 62 observations. Of the respondents, 30 have exposure in CEE. 
The regression results show a significant parameter for the evaluation of quality of local GPs. 
Hence, the H0 hypothesis is rejected. 
Table 19 
Logit Regression Results (GPqual, Independent Variable Is the Judgment of The Quality of CEE Fund 
Management Teams) 
  B  S.E.  Wald  Sig.  Exp(B)  Chi-square  Sig. 
GPqual  1,082    ,352  9,429  ,002  2,950 
Constant  -4,808  1,585  9,208  ,002    ,008 
13,787  ,000 
 
 
LPs that evaluate the quality of local CEE teams as good are more likely to invest. For 
indifferent investors, an increase in their evaluation of the quality of GP by one point on the 
Likert scale, all else being equal, will raise the likelihood of investing to 
2.950/(1+2.950) = 74.7%. The strong influence of this parameter, and the fact that the presence 
of qualified GPs is a very important country selection criteria, (as pointed out in chapter 5.2.2.), 
emphasize the fact that the funded teams in CEE must be regarded as very professional. This 
finding also highlights the characteristic of LPs to try to engage with the best GPs only. Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005) point out the existence of individual management teams who continue to 
perform strongly, and that therefore searching for good teams is worthwhile. Lerner and Schoar 
(2004) show that LPs should optimally sort out poorly performing GPs and commit to good 
ones only. However, not all LPs screen the GPs sufficiently. Lerner et al. (2005) find that 
endowments and public pension funds are more sophisticated in their selection processes, and 
use their insider information, and therefore are better able to forecast performance on follow-
on funds. However, with our small sample of endowments and pensions funds, we are not able, 
unfortunately, to follow up on this issue. 
6. Conclusions 
The Central Eastern European countries offer a large range of opportunities to international 
institutional investors. Expectations for economic growth for the coming decades are 
promising, and institutional as well as societal prerequisites in the European Union accession 
countries are favorable. Nevertheless, the supply of risk capital from institutional investors is 
relatively poor in relation to the opportunities in these countries, and compared to other 
countries. This is surprising and presents the challenge of identifying the obstacles to more 
institutional investment in this region. With a questionnaire sent out to 1,079 (potential) limited 
partners based all over the world we address the investors’ perceptions about the region. We ask 
for the determinants of their international asset allocation process, and link their institutional 
settings and exposure with their regional perceptions.  
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We find that institutional investors regard CEE as a very attractive region, ranking equally with 
India, and slightly higher than China. Among CEE, Poland is the most attractive country, 
followed by the Czech Republic and Hungary. We group possible allocation determinants into 
six criteria: economic activity, capital market, taxation, property rights protection, social 
environment and entrepreneurial activity. Within those groups we identify the most important 
decision parameters. When evaluating economic activity in a particular country, the investors 
focus on growth, rather than on size. When assessing the capital market and VC/PE market 
conditions, LPs search for qualified GPs and are interested in the deal flow. The size and 
liquidity of a stock market, as well as the IPO activity, are of a second order, i.e., of even lower 
importance, a finding which contradicts previous literature. The relevant taxes for institutional 
investors are those that directly affect them, namely dividend and capital gains taxes. The 
protection of property rights stands out as the most  important issue of all the aspects suggested 
as asset allocation determinants. Regarding the social environment, the expected 
entrepreneurial management quality and skills and the fear of bribery and corruption act as 
determinants in the decision-making process. Finally, the investors focus on entrepreneurial 
activity, and the entrepreneurial climate when taking decisions about country allocation. The 
availability of public funding and subsidiaries plays no role in allocation decisions and public 
money will not attract private money. Overall, the investors focus more on educated people and 
their potential than on any other criteria with the exception of protection for their claims. 
When assessing CEE with consideration to these allocation determinants, the institutional 
investors regard economic activity and entrepreneurial opportunities in the region as favorable. 
There is, however, one very important finding, which is that they do not feel comfortable about 
one very significant desire, which is protection of their claims. Thereby, it is of no relevance 
that investors might not be well-enough informed about the actual property rights protection 
legislature and enforcement possibilities in CEE. It is a fact that they are not comfortable with 
the current state. 
Grouping the investors into different categories reveals that there are no meaningful differences 
in the asset allocation processes. Splitting Europeans and non-Europeans shows that there is 
clearly a tendency to favor more distant markets. Europeans have better perceptions of the 
distant markets of China and India, while the non-Europeans expect more from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (the former Soviet Union). Other meaningful differences 
between Europeans and non-Europeans do not exist. 
Logit regressions about the actual investment decision and several allocation determinants 
highlight that historical performance is a very strong indicator for current and probably future 
exposure of institutional investors in the region. Furthermore, investors need to have profound 
knowledge of the region. Institutional investors are reluctant to commit capital in CEE if they 
do not have regional knowledge and experience. Informational efforts could help to overcome 
this issue. The regressions further reveal that LPs with CEE exposure are also attracted by other 
emerging regions, signaling a tendency of “emerging market investors”. Additionally, the CEE 
investors appreciate the entrepreneurial opportunities there. They do not regard their claims in 
CEE as being well-protected. Finally, they only commit capital if they find quality fund 
management teams. This emphasizes once again the dominant issue of people accompanying 
the numerous principal/agent relations in that asset class. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test on the Attractiveness of Different Emerging Regions 
The ranks and the test statistics are presented for the tests comparing Africa with the other 
regions. For all the other tests we present the test statistics only, to save space. 
Ranks 
      N  Mean rank  Sum of ranks 
Negative ranks  1  5,00  5,00 
Positive ranks  65  33,94  2206,00 
Ties  3     
CEE - Africa 
Total  69     
Negative ranks  5  18,70  93,50 
Positive ranks  59  33,67  1986,50 
Ties  2     
China - Africa 
Total  66     
Negative ranks  6  25,00  150,00 
Positive ranks  52  30,02  1561,00 
Ties  9     
CIS - Africa 
Total  67     
Negative ranks  3  5,50  16,50 
Positive ranks  63  34,83  2194,50 
Ties  2     
India - Africa 
Total  68     
Negative ranks  4  25,13  100,50 
Positive ranks  44  24,44  1075,50 
Ties  16     
Latin America - Africa 
Total  64     
Negative ranks  3  18,50  55,50 
Positive ranks  52  28,55  1484,50 
Ties  3     
South East Asia - Africa 
Total  58     
 
Test statistics(b): Africa vs. other emerging economies 
  
CEE - 





Asia - Africa 
Z  -7,081(a)  -6,377(a)  -5,521(a)  -6,998(a)  -5,086(a)  -6,038(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000  ,000  ,000  ,000  ,000 
 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
 
Test statistics(c): CEE vs. other emerging economies 
   China - CEE  CIS - CEE  India - CEE 
Latin America - 
CEE 
South East 
Asia - CEE 
Z  -1,404(a)  -5,196(a)  -,650(b)  -6,321(a)  -3,158(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,160  ,000  ,516  ,000  ,002 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Based on negative ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
Test statistics(c): China vs. other emerging economies 
   CIS - China  India - China 
Latin America - 
China 
South East 
Asia - China 
Z  -3,503(a)  -2,697(b)  -5,170(a)  -1,718(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,007  ,000  ,086 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Based on negative ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
Test statistics(c): CIS vs. other emerging economies 
   India - CIS 
Latin America - 
CIS 
South East 
Asia - CIS 
Z  -4,781(a)  -2,205(b)  -1,960(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,027  ,050 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Based on positive ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
Test statistics(b): India vs. other emerging economies 
  
Latin America - 
India 
South East 
Asia - India 
Z  -6,314(a)  -3,973(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
Test statistics(b): South East Asia vs. Latin America 
  
South East 
Asia - Latin 
America 
Z  -4,402(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
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Appendix 2: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test on the Attractiveness of the Individual CEE Countries 
 
























3,206(a)  -2,884(b)  -1,580(b)  -4,439(b)  -,375(a)  -,345(a)  -1,340(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,001  ,004  ,114  ,000  ,708  ,730  ,180 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Based on negative ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 















Z  -4,793(a)  -3,801(a)  -5,745(a)  -3,048(a)  -2,750(a)  -1,658(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000  ,000  ,002  ,006  ,097 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 

















Z  -1,392(a)  -2,960(b)  -2,658(a)  -3,590(a)  -3,690(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,164  ,003  ,008  ,000  ,000 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Based on negative ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 










Z  -3,774(a)  -1,794(b)  -2,524(b)  -3,081(b) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,073  ,012  ,002 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Based on positive ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 








Z  -5,171(a)  -5,228(a)  -5,162(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000  ,000 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
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Appendix 2 (continued) 
 






Z  -,117(a)  -,520(b) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,907  ,603 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Based on positive ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 




Z  -1,227(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,220 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
































36 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 




N  Mean 
Std. 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Percentiles 
                  25th 
50th 
(Median)  75th 
General economic 
size, measured by 
the GDP 
70  4,76  1,221  1  7  4,00  5,00  6,00 
Growth prospects 
of the target 
country 




   N  Mean rank  Sum of ranks 
Growth prospects of the 
target country - General 
economic size, measured 
by the GDP 
Negative ranks 
5(a)  17,30  86,50 
  Positive ranks  36(b)  21,51  774,50 
  Ties  17(c)     
  Total  58     
(a) Growth prospects of the target country < General economic size, measured by the GDP. 
(b) Growth prospects of the target country > General economic size, measured by the GDP. 




  Growth prospects of the target country - General 
economic size, measured by the GDP 
Z  -4,584(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
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Appendix 4: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test on the Importance of Capital Market Determinants 
 
Descriptive statistics 
   N  Mean 
Std. 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Percentiles 
                  25th 
50th 
(Median)  75th 
Availability of debt 
finance in the 
target country 
71  4,92  1,262  2  7  4,00  5,00  6,00 
Interest rates in the 
target country  66  4,33  1,128  2  7  3,75  4,00  5,00 
General capital 
market and M&A 
market activity 
69  5,72  ,953  3  7  5,00  6,00  6,00 
IPO market activity  69  4,90  1,152  2  7  4,00  5,00  6,00 





70  5,36  1,204  2  7  5,00  5,50  6,00 
Presence of 
qualified GPs  68  6,35  1,130  3  7  6,00  7,00  7,00 
Availability of public 
funding and 
subsidies 




64  4,16  1,566  1  7  3,00  4,00  5,00 
 
 































deal flow - 
Availabilit






































in the target 
country 
Z  -4,358(a)  -4,699(b)  -,065(a)  -5,664(b)  -2,852(b)  -5,678(b)  -5,963(a)  -2,787(a) 
Asymp. 
sig.    
(2 tailed) 
,000  ,000  ,948  ,000  ,004  ,000  ,000  ,005 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Based on negative ranks. 
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Appendix 4 (continued) 
 




















deal flow - 
Interest 






to support - 
Interest 
























in the target 
country 
Z  -6,216(a)  -3,678(a)  -6,522(a)  -4,771(a)  -6,050(a)  -4,830(b)  -,499(b) 
Asymp. sig.  
(2-tailed)  ,000  ,000  ,000  ,000  ,000  ,000  ,617 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Based on positive ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 

















































Z  -5,115(a)  -4,026(b)  -1,979(a)  -3,245(b)  -6,789(a)  -5,238(a) 
Asymp. sig.      
(2-tailed)  ,000  ,000  ,048  ,001  ,000  ,000 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Based on negative ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
Test statistics(c): IPO market activity vs. other criteria 
 
Expected deal 





support - IPO 
market activity 
Presence of 











portfolio - IPO 
market activity 
Z  -6,107(a)  -2,566(a)  -5,741(a)  -6,066(b)  -3,012(b) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,010  ,000  ,000  ,003 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Based on positive ranks. 
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Appendix 4 (continued) 























Z  -4,807(a)  -1,783(b)  -6,988(a)  -6,108(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,075  ,000  ,000 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Based on negative ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
Test statistics(c): Presence of professional institutions vs. other criteria 
 
Presence of 




















Z  -4,998(a)  -6,774(b)  -4,169(b) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000  ,000 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Based on positive ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 













Z  -6,784(a)  -5,594(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 









Z  -3,440(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,001 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test.  
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Appendix 5: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test on the Importance of Taxes 
 
Descriptive statistics 
   Percentiles 
  
N  Mean  Std. 
deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
25th  50th 
(Median)  75th 
Corporate tax 




60  5,05  1,567  1  7  4,00  5,00  6,00 
 
 







Z  -2,882(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,004 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
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  N  Mean  Std. 
deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
25th  50th 
(Median)  75th 
Bribery and 
corruption  70  5,91  1,073  1  7  5,00  6,00  7,00 















70  4,87  1,141  1  7  4,00  5,00  6,00 
Acceptance of 
VC/PE  70  5,49  1,271  2  7  5,00  6,00  6,25 
 
Test statistics(c): Bribery and corruption vs. others 
 






















VC/PE - Bribery 
and corruption 
Z  -5,186(a)  -3,045(b)  -6,504(a)  -5,473(a)  -2,629(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,002  ,000  ,000  ,009 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Based on negative ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 















people) - Crime 
rate 
Acceptance of 
VC/PE - Crime 
rate 
Z  -5,973(a)  -4,221(b)  -,585(b)  -2,531(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000  ,559  ,011 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Based on positive ranks. 
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Appendix 6 (continued) 
 
























Z  -7,035(a)  -6,675(a)  -5,014(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000  ,000 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 















Z  -4,644(a)  -5,702(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
Test statistics(b): Labor market rigidities vs. acceptance of VC/PE 
  
Acceptance of 






Z  -3,496(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
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Appendix 7: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test on the Importance of the Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
 
Descriptive statistics 
  N  Mean 
Std. 
deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Percentiles 






success strategies  69  5,54  ,994  3  7  5,00  6,00  6,00 
Entrepreneurial 
activity in the 
target country 




68  4,56  1,460  1  7  4,00  5,00  6,00 
 
 
Test statistics(c): Already proven success strategies vs. other criteria 
  
Entrepreneurial 
activity in the 











Z  -2,224(a)  -4,626(b) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,026  ,000 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Based on positive ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 






activity in the 
target country 
Z  -5,561(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
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Appendix 8: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test on the Five Most Important Criteria 
 
Test statistics(c): Expected deal flow vs. others 
  Presence of 
















local people - 
Expected deal 
flow 
Z  -1,783(a)  -2,742(a)  -1,363(b)  -1,588(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,075  ,006  ,173  ,112 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Based on positive ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 














local people - 
Presence of 
qualified GPs 
Z  -1,003(a)  -2,893(b)  -,341(b) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,316  ,004  ,733 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Based on positive ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 














Z  -4,594(a)  -1,993(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,046 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 






local people - 
Bribery and 
corruption 
Z  -3,045(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,002 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test.  
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Appendix 9: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test on the Attractiveness of the Six Socio-Economic Key 




  N  Mean 
Std. 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
25th 
50th 
(Median)  75th 
Economic 
activity  71  5,46  1,026  3  7  5,00  6,00  6,00 
Capital market  71  4,34  1,195  2  7  4,00  4,00  5,00 
Taxation  69  4,51  1,133  2  7  4,00  4,00  5,00 
Investor 
protection  70  4,21  1,318  1  7  3,00  4,00  5,00 
Social 
environment  67  4,33  1,006  2  6  4,00  4,00  5,00 
Entrepreneurial 
opportunities  69  5,03  1,236  3  7  4,00  5,00  6,00 
 





















Z  -6,052(a)  -5,631(a)  -5,971(a)  -6,092(a)  -3,481(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000  ,000  ,000  ,000 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
















Z  -1,336(a)  -,894(b)  -,204(b)  -4,737(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,182  ,371  ,838  ,000 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Based on positive ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 












Z  -2,098(a)  -1,341(a)  -3,026(b) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,036  ,180  ,002 
(a) Based on positive ranks. 
(b) Based on negative ranks. 
(c) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
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Appendix 9 (continued) 
 











Z  -,869(a)  -4,245(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,385  ,000 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 






Z  -4,621(a) 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
(a) Based on negative ranks. 
(b) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 